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I. Introduction 
Despite the general presumption in the finance literature in favor of the 
unpredictability of returns, there are some areas where predictability is well established. The 
effectiveness of technical trading rules has been documented in numerous studies, as 
surveyed by Park and Irwin (2007). Additionally, a large number of investigations confirm 
the presence of seasonal anomalies in many stock markets: Dzhabarov and Ziemba (2010) 
outline much of the relevant work in this area and show that many of the anomalies still exist. 
In this article, we depart from previous studies that have considered the rules and 
anomalies on an individual basis and examine the effect of combining them. The types of 
rules and anomalies (henceforth, for convenience, we will use the term ‘rule’ for both rules 
and anomalies) under consideration divide time periods into sub-periods when it is 
advantageous to be in the market and sub-periods when it is advantageous not to be in the 
market. When combining rules to obtain a trade signal, there are two fundamental issues to 
consider: i) the extent to which the different rules would select the same days to be in the 
market, and ii) the properties of market returns on a particular day conditional on a number of 
rules indicating that it is advantageous to be in the market on that day. These two aspects, the 
timing and the conditionality of market returns, generate a wide range of possible 
combinations of rules. Many of them would not otherwise be apparent when focusing on each 
rule in separation, giving a possibility of generating more advantageous outcomes than those 
available by investing directly in the market or by using a single rule. 
We empirically analyse the properties of combining three of the best known rules: the 
turn-of-the-month effect, the Halloween Effect and the moving average rule. All the rules 
have been known for many years in the academic literature and for longer by practitioners. 
Although the rules work well individually, we have not chosen them in a particular effort to 
maximize returns, but because they are well-known and form a parsimonious set. Some 
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authors have shown that calendar effects are not always independent from each other (e.g., 
Lucy and Zhao, 2008, Swinkels and Van Vliet, 2012); hence, one should not necessarily 
expect sizable improvements in profitability when combining signals from several arbitrarily 
chosen calendar-based rules. However, other studies demonstrate an (at least partial) 
independence of calendar effects, implying a potential for improved profitability of strategies 
which combine signals from different rules: Atanasova and Hudson (2010) show that moving 
average rules are largely independent from many seasonal anomalies, and Haggard and Witte 
(2010) find the Halloween to be substantially independent from the January effect. Our 
approach of combining different rules aims at utilizing this independence among rules and 
could easily be generalized to combinations of other rules.  
A wide variety of seasonal anomalies have been observed in financial markets for 
many years. The turn of the month effect (TOTM), whereby stock returns are substantially 
higher around the turn of the month, was reported by market experts such as Merrill (1966) 
and later in academic studies by Ariel (1987) and Lakonishok and Smidt (1988). Ariel 
considered the last trading day of the month and the first nine trading days of the next month 
whereas Lakonishok and Smidt consider the last trading day of the month and the first three 
trading days of the next month. Subsequent studies confirm the prevalence of this effect (e.g., 
Ogden, 1990; McConnell and Xu, 2008; Hudson and Atanasova, 2009). 
The Halloween effect and the very closely related ‘sell-in-May-and-go-away’ effect, 
whereby stock returns are lower in the summer months, first explicitly appeared in the 
academic literature in a paper by Bouman and Jacobsen (2002), although Gultekin and 
Gultekin (1983) deal with closely related issues. However, as Bouman and Jacobsen make 
clear, this rule has been well known to market practitioners for many decades. 
The technical analysis of securities is generally considered to be the earliest form of 
investment analysis. The oldest techniques date back at least to Charles Dow in the 1890s and 
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many techniques have been in use since the 1930s or before (Brock et al. 1992). Despite its 
popularity with practitioners, technical analysis was largely dismissed by prominent 
academics for many years (Malkiel, 1981). However, Brock et al. (1992) gave empirical 
support for the approach by showing that simple moving average and trading range break-out 
rules outperform a buy-and-hold approach on the Dow Jones Index from 1897 to 1986.  
There are a huge number of technical trading rules (see, e.g., Lo, Mamayski and 
Wang, 2000). However, the moving average rules used in the Brock et al. paper are very well 
known and have been the subject of the most academic scrutiny. Sullivan et al. (1999) find 
that the results are robust to data-snooping. The rules have also been shown to work in other 
equity markets (e.g., Hudson et al., 1996; Ratner and Leal, 1999) and for individual stocks 
(Bokhari et al., 2005), albert some evidence suggests that the performance of technical 
trading rules have largely diminished in the resent period (e.g., Shynkevich, 2012) or even 
did never exist when the data snooping bias and transaction costs are accounted for 
(Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012). Nevertheless, given the extensive popularity and evidence 
on the effectiveness of these rules, we let the data speak for itself and use them for our 
investigations.  
II. Data 
We initially carry out our investigation on daily data for the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average Index from 3/23/1896 to 5/26/2009 to obtain a long term view of the interactions 
between the rules and to confirm that combining them can be advantageous. 1 We 
subsequently analyse a later period to investigate how the interactions among rules have been 
performing relatively recently and whether they are economically exploitable given realistic 
trading costs on low-cost instruments such as futures. As futures on the Dow index were not 
                                                          
1 We do not extend the sample beyond March 2009, as the subsequent period was characterised by an increasing 
impact of unconventional monetary policy measures in the US; this would have affected the behaviour of the 
stock market in a way unprecedented in the modern history. Hence, the results in the most recent period could 
be different from those in the pre-QE era, an interesting issue to investigate but not the focus of this paper. 
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available for trading until 6th November 1997, in order to obtain a larger sample we instead 
investigate the profitability of trading in futures on S&P500 (large cap) index (available since 
23rd April, 1982) on combined signals generated by the S&P500 itself.  
III. Trading Strategy Design 
Each of the rules divides the period under investigation into sub-periods when it is 
advantageous to buy (and stay long) and sub-periods when it is advantageous to sell (and stay 
short, or at least out of the market). Different combinations of the rules can be assessed by 
combining the sub-periods (i.e., buy and sell periods as indicated by each rule) in various 
ways. For example, we can consider the sub-periods when all of the rules give a buy signal or 
alternatively periods when all the rules indicate a sell, or perhaps when two of the rules give a 
buy signal and one of the rules a sell signal.  
The moving average rules of Brock et al. (1992) operate as follows: buy (sell) signals 
occur when the short run moving price average, measured over past x days, is above (below) 
the long run moving average, measured over y past days, by an amount larger (smaller) than a 
band z. This is denoted as MA(x, y, z). The buy (sell) return for each day in the sample is 
calculated in accordance with these signals. In this study we illustrate the results from a 
MA(1,200,0) rule, although we have also examined other variants and the findings are robust. 
The TOTM effect gives buy signals on four days around the turn of each month, 
beginning on the last trading day of the month and ending on the third trading day of the 
following month. The Halloween effect gives buy signals between the 31 October and the 30 
April each year. 
IV. Results 
Table 1 shows how the rules have performed on an individual basis. Panel A shows 
for the DJIA index that the individual rules are highly predictive over the full sample period.  
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Table 1: Performance of Individual Rules 
Note: # days denotes the number of days in the sample for which a give rule generates a given signal; %pos 
denotes the fraction of days within each signal subsample (buy or sell) with positive returns; SD denotes 
standard deviation of returns. 
For the moving average rule the returns in the buy periods are positive and highly 
significant, the returns in the sell periods are negative, and the difference between the returns 
in the buy and sell periods is positive and highly significant. In line with the literature, the 
percentage of days with positive returns during buy and sell periods has also been calculated. 
This measure also shows the difference between buy and sell periods to be positive, i.e., to 
some extent the MA rule successfully separates days with positive returns from those with 
negative ones. The Halloween rule has positive and highly significant returns in the buy 
period and much smaller and insignificant returns in the sell period. The difference between 
the returns in the buy and sell periods is positive and marginally significant. The percentage 
of positive returns gives similar conclusions as for the MA rule. The TOTM rule has large 
and highly significant positive returns in the buy period and negative although insignificant 
returns in the sell period. The difference between the buy and sell returns is positive and 
significant, with the magnitude similar to the results in McConnell and Xu (2008). The 
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Panel A: Dow Jones, full sample: 1896 - 2009 
Mean 0.0386 -0.0177 0.0563 0.0306 0.0058 0.0248 0.1166 -0.0029 0.1195 
t-stat 6.1808 -1.3416 3.8610 3.5740 0.6397 1.9854 8.1263 -0.4186 7.5006 
p-value <0.00001 0.17974 0.00011 0.00035 0.52237 0.04711 <0.00001 0.67551 <0.00001 
# days 19429 11196 
 
15211 15613 
 
5400 25424 
 %pos 53.4768 50.0715 3.4053 52.2385 51.5596 0.6789 56.3333 50.9519 5.3815 
SD 0.8706 1.3932 
 
1.0551 1.1345 
 
1.0541 1.1037 
 Panel B: S&P500, futures trading sample: 1982-2009 
Mean 0.0428 -0.0079 0.0506 0.0505 0.0075 0.0430 0.0995 0.0119 0.0877 
t-stat 3.4991 -0.2002 0.9892 2.6256 0.3637 1.0837 3.2501 0.7500 1.8887 
p-value 0.00047 0.84133 0.32257 0.00865 0.71608 0.27851 0.00115 0.45326 0.05894 
# days 4874 1916 
 
3328 3462 
 
1292 5498 
 %pos 53.6110 50.8351 2.7759 53.2452 52.4263 0.8189 54.9536 52.3281 2.6254 
SD 0.8539 1.7031 
 
1.1085 1.2044 
 
1.1003 1.1712 
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difference in the percentage of positive returns between the buy and sell periods is also 
positive.  
Panel B of Table 1 looks at the results for the S&P500 index in a period starting in 
1982, when futures on S&P500 were traded. For the moving average rule, the returns in the 
buy periods are positive and highly significant, the returns in the sell periods are negative 
although not significant, and the difference between the returns in the buy and sell periods is 
positive but not significant. There is, however, a substantial positive difference between the 
percentage of positive returns in the buy and sell periods. The Halloween rule has positive 
and highly significant returns in the buy period and smaller and insignificant returns in the 
sell period. The difference between the returns in the buy and sell periods is positive and 
insignificant. There is a modest difference in the number of positive returns in the buy and 
sell periods. The TOTM rule has large and highly significant positive returns in the buy 
period and much smaller although insignificant returns in the sell period. The difference 
between the returns in the buy and sell periods is positive and marginally significant. The 
difference in the percentage of positive returns in the buy and sell periods is substantial. 
Overall, these results indicate that each of the rules, especially the TOTM, was successful in 
the whole sample, but their profitability seems to have diminished in a period starting in 
1982. These individual rules’ results constitute a benchmark for profits generated by 
combinations of rules, as analysed below. 
When testing multiple hypotheses on a set of data using a significance level α, the 
Null should be expected to be falsely rejected in α% of cases (type I error).2 In our case, we 
conduct six tests of significance of returns (buy and sell returns for three rules), hence some 
of the rejections of the Null could be spurious. One way to address this issue is to apply the 
Bonferroni correction to control the familywise error rate, by testing each individual 
                                                          
2 We thank the Editor for pointing this out. 
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hypothesis at a significance level of α /N, where N is the number of tests/hypotheses (Abdi, 
2007). The Bonferroni correction is rather conservative and can lead to a high type II error 
rates, especially for higher values of N. In our case, α /N=.05/6=.00833 for 5% and 
.1/6=.01667 for 10% significance levels, respectively. The comparison of relevant p-values 
with those adjusted significance levels reveals that our original conclusions based on 
unadjusted α values stand, with only one exception (for Halloween returns in the futures 
trading sample and for α=.05). 
Table 2 shows the results for all possible combinations of the three rules for the Dow 
Jones in the 1896 to 2009 period. If a rule generates a buy (sell) signal, this is denoted by ‘Y’ 
(‘N’) in the table’s heading. For instance, ‘YNY’ states that both the moving average and the 
turn of the month rules generate a buy signal and the Halloween rule generates a sell signal. 
Panel A shows each of the individual combinations. Panel B groups of the combinations by 
the number of rules generating buy signals. In general terms, it is clear that combining the 
rules does tend to increase their predictive power. The mean return actually increases 
monotonically with the number of rules generating buy signals (Panel B). A similar 
monotonic increase also occurs in the percentage of positive returns as the number of rules 
generating buy signals increases. The returns when at least two rules give buy signals are 
always positive and highly significant. When three rules give a buy signal (denoted ‘YYY’), 
the return is 0.1201%, which is larger than any rule achieves unconditionally (as reported in 
Table 1, Panel A). When only one rule gives a buy signal, the returns are not significant. 
When each rule gives a sell signal (‘NNN’), we observe a significant negative return. At -
0.0641%, this is much smaller than the returns on a sell day for any rule taken 
unconditionally (Table 1, Panel A). The difference between the return when all rules give a 
buy signal and when all rules give a sell signal (‘YYY-NNN’) is large at 0.1842% and highly 
significant.  
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Table 2: Performance of Combined Rules: Dow Jones (1896 – 2009)  
Panel A: All Individual Combinations 
MA(1,200) Y N Y Y N N Y N 
YYY- 
NNN Halloween 
Y Y N Y N Y N N 
TOTM Y Y Y N Y N N N 
Mean 0.1201 0.1089 0.1393 0.0301 0.0697 -0.0178 0.0088 -0.0641 0.1842 
t-stat 5.9207 2.5494 7.0363 3.1479 1.5843 -0.9306 0.8819 -2.9003 6.1411 
p-value <0.00001 0.01080 <0.00001 0.00165 0.11314 0.35207 0.37784 0.00373 
<0.000
01 
# days 1682 1010 1747 7683 929 4770 8317 4487 6169 
%pos 56.54 56.14 58.33 52.67 54.36 49.92 52.58 47.98 
 SD 0.8320 1.3573 0.8277 0.8375 1.3408 1.3232 0.9134 1.4796 
 
Panel B: Combinations Grouped by the Number of Rules Used 
MA(1,200) Y 
any 
two Ys 
any 
one Y 
N 
YYY-NNN Halloween Y N 
TOTM Y N 
Mean 0.1201 0.0560 0.0038 -0.0641 0.1842 
t-stat 5.9207 6.3528 0.4082 -2.9003 6.1411 
p-value <0.00001 <0.00001 0.68313 0.00373 <0.00001 
# days 1682 10440 14016 4487 6169 
%pos 56.54 53.96 51.79 47.98 
 
SD 0.8320 0.9004 1.1002 1.4796 
 
Note: # days denotes the number of days in the sample for which a give rule generates a given signal; %pos 
denotes the fraction of days within each signal subsample (buy or sell) with positive returns; SD denotes 
standard deviation of returns. 
It is also interesting to note that the higher returns generated by combining different 
rules are not related to an increased standard deviation of returns: the standard deviation of 
returns when all three rules give a buy signal is the lowest of any of the combinations at 
0.832% whereas the standard deviation of returns when all three rules give a sell signal is the 
highest of any of the combinations at 1.4796%. In fact, the standard deviation of returns 
decreases monotonically in line with the number of buy signals generated (Panel B). Thus, it 
seems that the superiority of profits from combined rules is not explained by this 
conventional measure of risk. The analysis of S&P500 index in the 1982 to 2009 period 
generates results which are qualitatively very similar to those for the DJIA investigated over 
the longer period (results available on request). In addition, these results are robust to the 
aforementioned Bonferroni correction, with the adjusted significance values taking into 
account that eight (four) hypotheses are being tested in Panel A(B) of Table 2 and using 
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adjusted significance values of .00625 and .01250 (.01250 and .02500) instead of the original 
significance levels of 5% and 10%, respectively. When compared against the p-values 
reported in Table 2, all of the original conclusions regarding significance of our results 
remain unchanged, with only one exception (for NYY rule at α=.05). Hence, our initial 
inference is robust to the multiple hypotheses issue. 
Overall, these findings show that combining the trading rules gives significant 
increases in the ability to predict returns and that higher predicted returns are not 
accompanied by higher risk. These findings suggest the possibility of existence of profitable 
trading strategies combining signals from then one rule. Table 3 shows the results of 
implementing trading strategies using rule combinations on recent data, when futures 
contracts were available on the index. Trading is conducted in futures on the S&P500 Index 
using buy-and-sell signals based on the same index. We use S&P500 rather than DJIA for 
trading since, firstly, futures on the former were traded since 1982 and on the latter only since  
1997, giving 15 years more of observations, and, secondly, the MA(1,200) rule in DJIA 
Index was reversed in the post-1997 period, resulting in trading signals leading to losses 
(results not reported to preserve space). Futures contracts are substantially cheaper to trade 
than either exchange-traded funds or portfolios of stocks tracking the index and so are more 
likely to produce profitable trading strategies net of transaction costs. We calculate the results 
of applying a “double or out” trading strategy following Bessembinder and Chan (1998) to 
various combinations of the rules. The neutral position is to hold the index (futures contract 
in our case). If a buy day is indicated, the investment in the index is doubled whereas, if a sell 
day is indicated, the funds are invested in bonds, thus giving broadly similar risk to a buy and 
hold strategy (the exact standard deviations are reported in the table). We use data on 3-
Month T-Bills secondary market rate from Fed St Louis as a proxy for risk-free bond 
investment. 
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Profits from trading on combinations of rules (Table 3, row 1) outperform the buy-
and-hold strategy applied to the index futures (row 2) when operating individually and also 
when at least two rules generate buy signals (if trading costs are not allowed for). There is a 
general decline in the annualized average returns as the number of rules generating buy 
signals declines. The average number of trades per year (row 4) and break-even transaction 
costs (row 5) are also shown in Table 3. The later measures how high the transaction costs 
would have to be to completely offset the profits, hence the lower they are the lower the net-
of-transaction-costs strategy returns would be for a given level of transaction costs. For 
individual rules, strategies that involve frequent trading such as the TOTM rule do relatively 
less well (i.e., have lower break-even transaction costs) whereas rules which involve little 
trading such as the Halloween rule do relatively better. However, lower trading costs and 
higher excess returns seem to be obtainable at a cost of higher volatility risk (row 6), as 
compared to the volatility of buy-and hold strategy (row 7). Trading costs for futures quoted 
in the literature vary from 0.05% to 0.5% (Chen et al., 2009), hence many of these rules could 
potentially generate excess profits even given realistic trading costs (rows 9-10). For instance, 
the table reports that at transaction costs of 0.25% the MA(1,200) and the Halloween rule 
would yield net return of 2.86% and 3.88%, respectively.  
As for the combinations of rules, buying when all three rules generate a buy signal 
(‘YYY’) yields the highest profits and break even transaction costs, whereas relying on fewer 
buy signals results in lower profits and break-even transaction costs. Hence, combining buy 
signals of these three different rules seems to increase the net profitability of the trading 
strategy. These high profits are accompanied by lower volatility, which further highlights the 
beneficial effect of combining three trading rules. At transaction costs of 0.25%, only the rule 
based on three simultaneous buy signals (‘YYY’) would yield positive excess returns, at
         10 
Table 3: Profits from double-or-out strategy from trading in S&P500 futures ( 26 April 1982 -23 March 2009) 
Panel A: All Individual Combinations 
MA(1,200) 
Row 
Y N Y Y N N Y N 
   Halloween Y Y N Y N Y N N MA(1,200) Halloween TOTM 
TOTM Y Y Y N Y N N N 
   Annualised average returns 
strategy (in %) 
1 11.6658 9.7282 10.3168 8.0637 6.1985 3.9454 4.5340 2.5964 13.1871 12.0098 16.5161 
Annualised average B&H 
returns S&P500 futures (in %) 
2 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 
Excess return over B&H 
SP500 futures average  
3 4.5347 2.5971 3.1857 0.9326 -0.9326 -3.1857 -2.5971 -4.5347 6.0559 4.8787 9.3850 
Average number of trades  
per year 
4 8.2392 7.7938 8.1278 7.4598 7.4598 8.1278 7.7938 8.2392 6.3835 2.0041 23.9753 
Break-even transaction costs 5 0.2752 0.1666 0.1960 0.0625 -0.0625 -0.1960 -0.1666 -0.2752 0.4743 1.2171 0.1957 
Annualised standard deviation 
of trading strategy returns 
6 282.0962 320.4894 314.3368 382.9346 320.8239 392.9265 386.5446 460.7953 400.4686 411.4222 264.4038 
Annualised standard deviation 
B&H S&P500 futures 
7 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 
Sharpe ratio 8 0.0414 0.0304 0.0328 0.0211 0.0193 0.0100 0.0117 0.0056 0.0329 0.0292 0.0625 
Realised excess net return p.a. 
(assuming TC of 0.05) 
9 3.7108 1.8177 2.3729 0.1866 -1.6786 -3.9985 -3.3765 -5.3587 5.4176 4.6783 6.9874 
Realised excess net return p.a. 
(assuming TC of 0.25) 
10 0.4152 -1.2998 -0.8782 -2.7973 -4.6625 -7.2496 -6.4940 -8.6543 2.8642 3.8767 -2.6027 
Jensen’s alpha 
(p-value) 
11 
0.0169 
(0.064) 
0.0033 
(0.690) 
-0.0016 
(0.847) 
-0.0089 
(0.235) 
-0.0111 
(0.184) 
-0.0227 
(0.002) 
-0.0224 
(0.005) 
-0.0410 
(0.004) 
0.0282 
(0.056) 
-0.0147 
(0.001) 
0.0516 
(<0.001) 
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Table 3 continued 
 
0.42%. Furthermore, as reported in Table 3, Panel B, trading on three buy signals, rather than 
just (any) two or one, generates the highest break-even transaction costs and realized net 
returns (assuming transaction costs of 0.25%). 
However, the picture of benefits from combining three independent trading rules is 
not unambiguous: each of these rules, when used individually, generates higher excess 
returns and two of them (MA and Halloween) also higher break even transaction costs than 
even the most profitable combination of rules. However, these higher profits are accompanied 
by higher volatility, which in turn makes the strategy of trading on combination of rules more 
attractive. In fact, the Sharpe ratio (row 8) for the YYY rule is higher than those for MA and 
Halloween-based strategies, and while it is lower than the one for TOTM, the latter is 
characterized by much lower break-even transaction costs than those for the YYY rule. 
Hence, no rule is strictly dominant and for traders with relatively high transaction costs and 
poorly diversified portfolios (when total volatility risk matters), the YYY rule could well be 
the optimal choice. 
We further investigate to what extent the gross profits obtainable from trading 
strategies are simply a compensation for risk. To this end, we employ the Carhart (1997) 
Panel B:  Combinations Grouped by the Number of Rules Used 
MA(1,200) 
Row 
Y 
any 
two Ys 
any  
one Y 
N 
Halloween Y N 
TOTM Y N 
Annualised average returns strategy (in %) 1 11.6658 13.8465 0.4157 2.5964 
Annualised average B&H returns S&P500 futures (in %) 2 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 7.1311 
Excess return over B&H SP500 futures average  3 4.5347 6.7154 -6.7154 -4.5347 
Average number of trades per year 4 8.2392 23.1588 23.1588 8.2392 
Break even transaction costs 5 0.2752 0.1450 -0.1450 -0.2752 
Annualised standard deviation of trading strategy returns 6 282.0962 372.4969 444.2182 460.7953 
Annualised standard deviation of B&H S&P500 futures 7 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 323.5574 
Sharpe ratio 8 0.0414 0.0372 0.0009 0.0056 
Realised excess net return p.a. (assuming TC of 0.05) 9 3.7108 4.3995 -9.0313 -5.3587 
Realised excess net return p.a. (assuming TC of 0.25) 10 0.4152 -4.8640 -18.2948 -8.6543 
Jensen’s alpha  
(p-value) 
11 
0.0169 
(0.064) 
0.0299 
(0.035) 
0.0131 
(0.410) 
-0.0410 
(0.004) 
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model using data on risk factors obtained from Prof. Kenneth French’s website. The model 
provides the measurement of Jensen’s alpha for each trading strategy, which is reported in the 
last row of Table 3. The results confirm the finding reported for risk-unadjusted returns that 
combining more buy signals within one strategy yields higher (risk-adjusted) profits, e.g., the 
Jensen’s alpha is a significant 0.017 for the YYY strategy and declines as fewer buy signals 
are used, being the lowest for the NNN strategy (a significant negative value of -0.041). 
When used individually, the MA and TOTM effects still outperform the market by yielding 
positive (risk-adjusted) profits, whereas the Halloween effect seems to significantly 
underperform the market. The latter finding complements the previous observation that the 
Halloween effect was found to generate the lowest gross returns accompanied by the highest 
volatility risk. When the number but not the specific combinations of buy signals is 
considered (Table 3, panel B), the pattern of risk-adjusted returns is broadly similar to the one 
for gross returns, i.e., the combination of all effects yields a second-best outcome, after the 
strategy which utilizes any two signals. Lastly, similarly to the risk-unadjusted results, two of 
the individual rules (MA and TOTM) yield higher Jensen’s alphas than even the most 
profitable combination of rules (YYY). However, profits from one of these individual rules 
(MA) suffer from higher return volatility, whereas the other rule (TOTM) is associated with 
lower break-even transaction costs.  
In summary, a combination of rules can be an attractive investment strategy, 
depending on the individual trader’s transaction costs and the degree of diversification of 
their portfolio, as the later determines whether the total volatility risk or only the systematic 
risk is relevant to them: when transaction costs are low, a TOTM-based strategy appears to be 
superior regardless of the diversification level, and the MA(1,200) rule generates superior results 
for well diversified traders with high costs. However, for a typical individual investor, i.e., with high 
transaction costs and only a few stocks in their portfolio, combining three rules yields the best results. 
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V. Conclusion 
Although there is a large literature on trading rules and seasonal anomalies, 
surprisingly, there is very little work on the potential benefits of combining these effects. In 
this paper, we demonstrate the potential advantages of the latter approach by combining some 
of the best known effects from the literature. Combining trading rules yields certain benefits, 
especially if we consider poorly diversified traders who face high transaction costs, i.e., 
typical individual investors. Whilst we have used three well known rules, the approach of 
combining individual rules can easily be generalized to any combination of rules, and could 
potentially result in an even more superior performance. Further improvements could 
potentially be achieved by (possibly time-varying) weighting of signals generated by each 
component rule. In theoretical terms, our findings can add to the understanding of the 
properties of asset markets and in particular to the literature on efficient markets, which has 
previously neglected the combination of established market effects. It is apparent that rule 
combinations can potentially add value by allowing the optimum timing of trades. From the 
evidence we have provided it also seems that rule combinations can be profitable for trading 
in their own right given realistic trading costs. In summary, it is clear that combining 
anomalies and trading rules is of great interest from both theoretical and practical viewpoints. 
An important avenue for future research is to consider how one might seek to optimize the 
vast number of potential combinations of trading rules whilst guarding against the pitfalls of 
data mining. There are a least two broad potential approaches: create a large number of rules 
and systematically investigate the effects of combining them (White, 2000), or, alternatively, 
use an approach that can generate new rules by combining existing rules, which is a process 
fairly similar to that used in Intelligent Agent Modelling (see, for example, Manahov et. al., 
2014).  
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